BORDERS, IDENTITIES AND KIN POLITICS IN THE BALKANS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE AT THE TURKISH-BULGARIAN BORDER by Nurcan Ozgur Baklacioglu
                                                             IBAC 2012 vol.1  
 
 
165 
 
BORDERS, IDENTITIES AND KIN POLITICS IN THE BALKANS: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE AT THE TURKISH-BULGARIAN BORDER 
 
Nurcan Özgür BAKLACIOĞLU 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper focuses upon the historical and social construction of various 
crossborder identities across Turkish-Bulgarian border and elaborates the role of 
the border minorities, dual citizens and local kin politics on the development of the 
economic, political and cultural cooperation across the border. While the post-
communist oppening of the border led to the formation of new crossborder actors 
such as seasonal migrants, dual citizens, border minorities,irregular migrants, twin 
associations, schools, municipalities and free trade zones, the Europeanisation of 
the border gives rise to new physical, electronic and digital fences and wals. The 
paper questions the possible outcomes of the interractions that take place amids this 
binary top-down and bottom-up dynamics. The question of how Europeanisation of 
the border could affect the local social, political, economic and cultural structures 
and dynamics? lays at the core of the study.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
During the last decade, border studies have come a long way from the study of the 
hard territorial line separating states within the international system to the 
contemporary study of borders as a process of bordering, symbols and perceptions, 
through which territories and peoples are respectively included or excluded. 
(Newman, 2003; 2006). Once thought to be rigid, the lines and borders are as 
flexible as they were reflecting new territorial and aspatial patterns of human 
behaviour. The modern digital and cyber technologies has deminished the 
traditional barrier role of borders, while have served to create new sets of symbolic, 
social and administrative borders and boundaries that enclose groups with common 
identities and interests dispersed all around the world. The new networked borders 
do not require territorial attachment.  
 
As Paasi (1998) underlines the borders are not anymore simple lines drawn on a 
map but they are institutions which possess their own internal rules and functions 
and their own mechanisms..Emphasizing the performative role of the borders, Scott 
(2006) suggests that the borders are not just institutions but elements of everyday 
procedures that lies deeply embedded within society. These procedures are 
identified and work throug ideologies, behaviors and perceptions and are resembled 
through symbols, principles and norms. 
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The borders are social and ideological inventions that perform certain 
functions.Through their institutional and procedural functions, the borders define 
“who is us” and “who are the others”, they impose entry and exit conditions and act 
as “filters” that determine the degree of permeability of individuals, ideas and 
principles. They have the capacity to separate, categorize and select the political, 
social, economic and geographic differences..They function as barriers that exclude 
and include, prevent or allow the entrances and exists in a group, society, institution 
or territory. However, as the Janus face of the borders suggests, the borders and 
border zones provide also places of contact, interaction,and hybridity that bridges 
different cultures, ideas, ideologies, performances and social entities.  
 
The Balkan history used to be constructed under the discourse of the traditional 
territorial conception of the borders. The territorial and ethnogeorgaphical 
hostillities and nationalist historiographies used to emphasize the conflictual and 
dividing function of the borders. Nevertheless, with its ethnic, historical and 
religious compozition and hibridity the Balkans present one of the most fruitfull 
area to investigate the complex Janus faced nature of the borders as physical, 
political, social and symbolic constructions that not only separate, delineate and 
divide, but also bridge, meet and combine. 
 
 
Historical and Socio-Political Construction of Crossborder Identities in the 
Balkans  
 
In the Balkan historiography the borders convey the traditional ethno-territorial 
meaning of the border as a place of fear and threat. The history of the borders in this 
region is more about the border as a subject of power relations and imposition of the 
Great powers. The demarcation, delimitation and ultimate location of boundaries 
are a function of power relations, while the territorial legacy of partition, division 
and boundary superimposition remains a prominent component in the Balkan map 
today. The boundary superimposition lies at the core of many local conflicts in the 
region. The borders symbolize not only the interrupted nation-building and shifting 
sovereignity, but also divided identities and histories as well. The borders in the 
Balkans demarcated and delineated the sovereignity of the nation-states, but also 
constituted traumatic gates for millions of forced migrants, exchanged populations, 
refugees etc. Only the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-78 resulted in deaths of 
millions and emigration of 1.445.000 Muslim refugees from the Bulgarian to 
Anatolian lands. (Eren, 1993:298) Thus a mutual geography of fear and pain has 
maintained untangible separation between people who have been driven from their 
homes to the “other” side of the boundary. 
 
The most painfull years of the late-Ottoman Balkan history are the years following 
the Balkan wars. Intertwined with ethno-territorial wars and exoducess the nation-
building processes in the region emphasized the borders primarily as military zones 
and war stages. Militarization of the national borders had been a necessary 
condition against any external hostile aspirations and territorial claims that led to 
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the Balkan Wars and WWI and WWII. The wars ended with forced emigrations of 
millions from both Balkans(Ağanoğlu, 2001) and Anatolia and numerous bilateral 
border agreements to recognise, order, regulate, manage and control the borders as 
national barriers. Known as the Ottoman gate to the Gorgeous Roumeli,i.e. Balkans, 
the Bulgarian-Turkish border zone undergone subsequent Greek, Bulgarian and 
Turkish alegations and invasions until Lausane Treaty declared the official 
Bulgarian-turkish border in 1923. The Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian 
collonisation and nationalisation of the occupied Ottoman lands after the WWI 
(Stokes,1998: 25-30) followed by forced deportations of the Ottoman population 
from Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia(Noel Malcolm,1999:342). 
According to Ottoman Migration Commision, between years 1919-1926 
198.688(Şimşir,1986) refugees from Bulgaria and 131.000 refugees from Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia crossed the Bulgarian-Turkish border towards Anatolia. The 
Bulgarianisation of the Pomak population in Southwestern Bulgaria between 1931-
35 led to forced migration of Pomak villages to the Eastern Thracean part of the 
Turkish-Bulgarian border. During 1930’s the fashist Koseivanov government 
deported Turkish intelectuals in Bulgaria. The territorial exchanges and the shifts at 
the Romanian-Bulgarian border in Dobrucea resulted in the emigration of Tatars 
and Turks. Following the proclamation the Turkish Republic the Bulgarian-Turkish 
border undergone passages of approximatelly 1.519.368 Muslims and Turks (Eren, 
1966:91) (Table 1) and 30-50.000 Thracean Bulgarians and Armenians (in 1913). 
 
Table 1: Balkan Migrations to Anatolia 
 
Years  Yugoslavia  Romania  Greece  Bulgaria 
1912-1913 440.000 
1923-1939  115.427  117.095  384.000  198.688 
1940-1945 1.671 4.201 - 15.744 
1946-1960  152.003  55 23.808  154.112 
1961-1970 30.502  274  2.081 15.000 
1971-1980 1.797  136 -  116.104 
1981-1990 2.623  760 -  178.664* 
1993-1997       77.000 
Total  304.023  122.521  409.889  749.648 
General Total 2.026.081 
 
Source: (Şimşir, 1986), (Kirisci, “Post Second…”, 1995:175-80) 
                                                          
* Jivkov yönetiminin devrilmesinden sonra Bulgaristan’a geri dönen 133.272 göçmen hariç 
tutulmuştur. 
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These interwar processes of national and territorial socialization constructed 
national identities with national territory as a major component of identity 
construction in the region. The constitutive significance of the territory is one of the 
major legacies of the interwar history in the Balkans. So, the borders in the interwar 
Balkans constituted indivisible part of the territorial and national identity. Most of 
the historical anymosities and conflicts today lie at this period of Balkan history. 
 
The post-WWII history of socialist federalization has frozen the territorial conflicts 
in the region. National borders have been subsumed as internal administrative 
borders in the Soviet or Yugoslav federations, while others delineated the 
WarsawZone. During the communist era the borders in the Balkans constituted 
geographies of exclusion that separated two ideolojical camps. The main function of 
the borders at that time was to provide the invisibility of the “other” side. The 
invisibility itself created a new Cold War dimension of fear emanating from the 
capitalist side of the border. The Bulgarian, Yugoslavian borders and the Berlin 
Wall had been institutionalized as borders of the two hegemonic ideologies of the 
Cold War. Common charachteristic of these borders is an underdeveloped border 
zones under threat of occupation during potential war, no extensive investments, 
local colonizations and displacement of the autochtone populations.  
 
The post-WWII migration era(Castles&Miller,2008) was based on social and 
economic modernization and ideological competition across the two sides of the 
Berlin Wall. The Bulgarian-Turkish border faced with political asylum movements 
between the Eastern and Western Block. 31% of the Balkan immigrants who came 
to Turkey untill 1960 came from Bulgaria and 22.4% from Yugoslavia. (Geray:6-
12) The socialist and nationalisation reforms raised radical social, cultural and 
political borders in the front of the Muslim populations in these countries. Forcefull 
defeat of the minority opposition to the Stalinist reforms resulted in forced 
emigration of 250.000 Bulgarian Muslims and Turks (Stoyanov,1992: 10-11) and 
from 151.889 up to 412.000 Muslims and Turks from Yugoslavia. (Özgür 
Baklacıoğlu,2010)  
 
However, in the post-Stalinist era the people in the communist Balkans did not 
experience the borders between the Republics of ex-Yugoslavia or the other 
communist states (except Albania) as a barrier. Without difficulties they worked 
across the borders, attended nearby schools irrespective of the border side, owned 
and cultivated agrarian land in cross-border area, intermarried and maintained 
various intensive daily crossborder contacts across the borders. During these years 
the Bulgarian-Turkish border permormed as an external border of the communist 
block that connects the Eastern Europe with the Middle East. 
 
During 90’s the borders in the Balkans faced controversial binary phenomena. After 
the break down of the Berlin Wall, the internal borders of the Warsaw area of 
freedom of movement turned into external borders of the new liberal democratic 
states. Throughout wars, ethnic cleansing and new territorial agreements the internal 
borders of the Yugoslavian federation became external borders of new independent 
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states. The border regimes changed, and affected the perception and performances 
of the borders and the borderlanders. Similar to the intwerwar years the ethnic and 
religious identity of the populations settled across the borders gained significance 
and led to new securitization of the borders. Years after WWII the borders in the 
Balkans constituted again a geography of fear, exile and conflict. After the Great 
Excursion of Bulgarian Turkish refugees in 1989, the Bulgarian-Turkish border 
undergone mass refugee inflows of 35.000 Bosnian (1993-95), 15.000 Kosovo 
(1997-98) and 6.151 Macedonian Turkish (after March 2001) refugees.  
  
The fear of spread of potential regional war found reflection in rearticulation of the 
borders as bridges for cooperation and friendship. In 1993 the Bulgarian-Turkish 
Friendship Agreement underlined the significance of the 1925 Agreement which 
arranged enjoyable opportunities of movement, employment and migration across 
the Bulgarian-Turkish border. In the late-90’s both countries had reached 
agreements for the demilitarisation of the border regions and signed an agreement 
for clearance of the mine zones and lower customs and tax regime fort he Turkish 
trucks across the border.(“Bulgarian and Turkish Ministers…”, 2002) Some military 
units had been removed or shifted from the border. The Bulgarian border 
constituted one of the bussiest commercial and migratory borders opening for 
Europe. The end of the Cold War promoted the regional commercial and private 
traffic as well. According to the Edirne Municipality data in year 1990-93 the 
border crossings had reached 8.302.472 per year(“Sınır Kapıları”,2002). Although a 
good part of these crossings constituted of Iraqi refugees escaping the Gulf War on 
the way to Germany, there was important number of local visitors and suitcase 
traders.  
 
During the intewar years the Bulgarian textile and leather production in Gabrovo 
used to exchange its products with the Bulgarian merchants in Eminonu, İstanbul. 
During 90’s the Turkish middle and small range bussines from Turkey started to 
discover the small markets and cheap labor of Bulgaria and Romania. The İstanbul 
market profitted through the suitcase trade with the small Eastern European 
merchants, while at the same time taught the free market rules to the new-born 
Bulgarian businessman. The crossborder social linkages and networks of the 
Turkish minority produced important crossborder regional economies integrated 
into new trans-border and trans-national geographies during 90’s. After each great 
economic crisis in Bulgaria, the dimuirging mass unemployment in the minority 
regions trigered increase in the labor emigrations to Turkey. Family-to-family 
linkages among the Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria and Turkey facilitated the 
intensification of economic migrations to Turkey during 90’s. Beside the Turkey’s 
strict visa prohibition for the Bulgarian Turks, the number of the irregular Bulgarian 
Turkish immigrants in Turkey exceeded 76.000, while the registered ones were only 
33.123. (“İçişleri Bakanı Meral…”, 1997:11-12) After the facilitation of the EU 
visa requirements for Easern European citizens in 2001 the family and kin networks 
in Western Europe prevailed. The border crossings at the Bulgarian –Turkish border 
fall to 1.198.516 crossings in 2001. 
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The available data talks about 30.000 Bulgarian Turks in Sweden, 10-30.000 in 
Netherlands and 1000 in Austria. (Laczko,:2002, 187; The Sophia Echo, 2009) The 
real numbers of the Bulgarian Turkish economic seasonal migrants in the Western 
Europe surpass the available data, because there is constant circulation of labour 
between the minority regions and Western European countries. The main resons for 
the emigration to Turkey or Western Europe are(Маева&Манчева, 2004) :  
 
• Shut down schools, unemployed Turkish teachers, low educational levels 
amongst the minority children  
• Emptied villages as result of emigration to the cities, Turkey or Western 
Europe  
• Unemployment rate 80% 
• EU minority development projects applied selectively and insufficiently, 
primarily in the Pomak and Roma minority regions 
• Underdeveloped infrastructure, Low investments  
• seasonal migration opportunities in Western Europe  
• Organised employment networks established between the Western Europe 
and the minority villages in Bulgaria 
• Illegal employment, low wages, social insecurity 
 
While the labor emigration to Turkey leads to irregularization of the stay and 
employment and ends up into permanent emigration to Turkey, the labor emigration 
to Western Europe is under temporary legal residence and illegal employment 
managed and organised through work-finding agents or village Networks. The field 
interviews show that the labor emigration to Western Europe rarely ends up into 
permanent emigration, instead, the accumulation of the migrant resources promotes 
the inter migration in Bulgaria, ie permanent emigration from the village to the city 
that provides sufficient education opportunities for the children. If there was an 
opportunity for legal residence in Turkey and promotion of the seasonal 
employment than the tendency for permanent emigration to Turkey would decrease. 
The post-communis crossborder movements across the border raised new actors 
with various identities, performances and expectations across the border.  
 
 
New Actors, New Performances in the Crossborder Sites 
 
The clossest minority that are involved into daily crossborder activity and exchange 
are the Bulgarian Turkish and Roma minorities. The most part of the seasonal and 
irregular migrants, as well as suitcase traders in Turkey is constituted by Turks and 
Roma that live in border cities such as Haskovo, Svilengrad, Kırcali and Burgaz. 
There are also about 862.712 (in year 2000) and 401.597 (in 2001) gurbetchi 
tourists that cross the border each summer on the way to Anatolia. (“Kapıkule 
Sezona…”, 2001) The minority migrants and dual citizens that immigrated and 
settled in the Thracean border region after 1989 constitute the second active 
crossborder group that is more interersted in family bussiness and trade of 
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Bulgarian foods at the small “Bulgarian immigrant market kiosks” in İstanbul. 
Banitsa, boza, vafla, salami, Bulgarian cheese and yoghurt are some of the 
numerous communist-time tastes that take place at these migrant shop shelves.  
 
The primary institutional actors across the border are the small busines companies 
and small range investors. The number of the Turkish companies that invested in 
Bulgaria during 90’s had reached the number of 1100. Many of them went 
bankrupt, the biggest ones are concentrated in construction, tourism, textile etc. 
sectors. The free trade zones and Plovdiv and Edirne Trade Fairs provide the most 
important channels for the regional crossborder cooperation and exchange across 
the border. Between 1992- 2001 Haskovo border municipality attracted 41.64 
million USD in foreign investments. As a border city the economy of Svilengrad 
depends a lots on the crossborder free trade zones extending to the Greek and 
Turkish sides of the border and the Svilengrad-Edirne municipality cooperation. 
Important limit to the strenghtening of this cooperation is partly the ethnic 
background of the population of Svilengrad which became a city of colonisation 
after 1913 when Bulgarian refugees from Western and Eastern Thrace had been 
settlet around.  
 
Bulgarian Side Turkish Side 
Seasonal migrants Retired dual 
citizens  
Thrace Bulgarians Bulgarian Turks 
Roma Bulgarian Tourists 
Migrant associations Dual citizens 
Minority migrants 
Gurbetchi (European Turks) Twin municipalities Free Trade Zones Universities 
 
Acting continuously across the border most of these actors undergone dual 
processes of political and territorial socialization. So, typical for these new actors 
are dual attachment and affiliation to two different places, territories and social 
spaces. Especially the Bulgarian Turkish minority and dual citizen migrants have 
developed extensive cultural, economic, political links and performances across the 
border and transformed the border from a place of separation into place of linkage 
and new local, mixed identifications. (Figure 2). 
Political parties and NGOs play a key role for social, political and cultural 
integration of minorities - including their adequate representation in decision-
making process at local, regional and national levels. 
 
As globalization extended the role of migrant communities through internal 
restructuring, higher capacity of mobility and access to information the migrant 
communities expanded their sphere of activity from culture to politics. This 
functional change led to diasporization of migrant communities as in the case of 
Bulgarian Turkish migrants which started collective action for their social rights left 
behind in Bulgaria. The search for social compensation mobilised crossborder 
political action of the migrant associations around the discourse of human rights and 
freedoms. Crossborder elections constitute fruitful stage for the lobbying and 
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propaganda performances of these actors. The associations use to put pressure over 
the minority leaders and the leaders in Turkey, mobilize and register the ellectoral 
vote in Turkey and prepare the electoral stages, as well as in some cases monitor the 
elections themselves. They are also involved in advising and reporting on the 
human rights problems and cultural expectations of the minority in Bulgaria.  
 
Figure 2: The “Other” in the National 
Policies
Identity Divided vs.  Merged
BULGARIA
Migrant vs. Local
• Patriot vs. Disloyal
• Ours (Nashenets) vs. 
Turk
• Educated vs. 
Uneducated
• Poor vs. Rich
• Greedy vs. Sacrificing
TURKEY
Migrant vs. Local
Hardworking vs. Lazy
Loyal vs. Disloyal
Modern vs. Traditional
Educated vs. Uneducated
Kemalist 
“good Turk”
 
 
As defenders of the migrants rights, the migrant associations are the prime 
opponents of the nationalistic claims among some Bulgarian associations in 
Bulgaria too. Based on the fact that most of the association leaders have personal 
and commercial affairs with Bulgaria, they do not feel independent enough to apply 
harsh opposition against the Bulgarian governments. Neither there is clear 
opposition against the aspirations of the Thracean Associations in Bulgaria. This is 
a union of associations of the Bulgarians and Armenians who emigrated from 
Eastern Thrace after September 1913. Organised under rather nationalist 
propaganda, these diasporic groups claim for financial compensations for their lost 
properties at the Thracean frontiers at the Turkish side of the border. Their 
attachment to this “sacred territory” is based around symbols, signs and 
myths(Bulgarian and Armenian chirches, cemeteries, village names, schools ets.) in 
the landscape, as well as the creation of territorial histories and myths which reflect 
the hollyness of this exclussve ancestral homeland called once upon a time Odrin 
kingdom of Bulgarians. Yet, there is not direct face to face quarrel between the 
migrant associations at the both sides of the border, the claims fight through the 
governments.  
Inportant competition goes among some anti-Dogan associations in Turkey and the 
MRF leader in Bulgaria. Some of the associations use to question the legitimacy, 
performance and efectivty of the MRF’s leadership and ask for radical change at the 
top of the minority party. The electoral performance of the MRF and its ability to 
overcome the legal and political pressure of the nationalist circles in Bulgaria, 
provide the MRF with sufficient capacity to afford these opponent voices. 
Moreover, MRF as a minority party that represent only 5-7% of the electoral vote 
has representations in 28 municipalities, 247 districts, 2128 quarters where itis 
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represented by 68.000 members (in 2003-2006) and 24.000 members in the Youth 
organisation of MRF. Through this wide organisation the MRF suports higher 
political and administrative representation of the Turkish minority elite in the 
parties, bureaucracy, politics, i.e. enlarges the political elit amongs the minorities.  
 
The MRF’s Turkey sponsored quota for high education in Turkey provided high 
education opportunities for up to 1500 minority members. There are more than 
20.000 Bulgarian students abroad that are spronsored by the Bulgarian government, 
but there is no available data about the representation of the minorties in this quota. 
The schooling and employment problems and the absence of effective social 
policies in the minority regions leads to low education quality among the minorities. 
Although approached as a threat to Bulgarian unity and a priviledge, the high 
education opportunities provided in Turkey and the crossborder vote provide 
important ground reproducing the cultural identity of the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria as well as opens new perspectives for common action and hopes for future 
projections among the young minority members. Doubtlessly, these crossborder 
activities provide a social tool for creating an active cross-border cultural space, yet, 
this cultural space works within the cultural, political and economic sphere of the 
minority and involves low number of Bulgarians. The anti-Roma and anti-Turkish 
feelings among the nationalist Bulgarians are still strong. For example there are 
only few cases of twin municipality initiatives that meet a Bulgarian and Turkish 
populated municipalities. While the migrant Networks and cultural affiliation 
constituted the basic reasons for establishing twin municipalities, after the 
Europeanisation economic factors and efforts for requisition of the EU funds 
dominated in the initiation of twin municipalities.  
 
So far, beside the dual citizen migrants and the local bussiness, the most EU-
involved active crossborder actors are the twin border municipalities. They head, 
take part or overtake the coordination of many local crossborder economic, cultural 
and societal cooperation initiatives that usually involve the local NGO’s too. As itis 
well known not always the interests of these institutional crossborder actors 
represent the expectations of the minorities, very often these institutions and groups 
take under consideration the kin-state sensitivities and convey different cultural 
values and norms. For example, in an attempt to isolate the impact of some radical 
Islamic sects such as Rabita, Suleymancılar etc. Turkish Diyanet is suporting the 
opening of some Islamic schools in Bulgaria, however, there are differences in the 
Islamic rituals and understanding at the two sides of the border. Thus these 
initiatives are perceived as imposition of foreign Islamic values among the Islamic 
circles in Bulgaria.  
 
The rise of the Bulgarian nationalism after 2008 constitutes the primary factor that 
hamper the development of crossborder cooperation through activisation of ethnic 
and historcal bias and hostility, populist nationalism, revanshizm, corruption, 
instable political life etc.. The absence of common competencies and low foreign 
capital investment in border zones results in ad hoc, less institutionalised, temporary 
cultural cooperation.  
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Conclussion: Europeanisation of the Border: Eurozone Cooperation on New 
physical, Electronic and Digital Fences and Walls. 
  
How Europeanisation of the border could affect the local social, political, economic 
and cultural structures and dynamics? : EU enlargement created a new eastern 
border in the Eastern Europe. This borderline goes through areas inhabited by 
people who belong to 71 minorities (Toth,2006:21), thus speak numerous different 
languages, but share the values, culture and memories of the same communist past. 
Beside the ethno-territorial problems and claims, there are many cultural, moral and 
historical similarities as legacies of the communist education, social life and cultural 
policies. This is one of the factors that tends to support the local crossborder 
initiatives. For example few years after the Balkan wars the former Yugoslav 
republics removed the visa limitations and initiated crossborder freedom of 
movenet, exchange and cooperation.  
 
The introduction of the Schengen regime and the Europeanisation of some of the 
borders in the Southeastern Europe defeated the traditional local crossborder 
dinamics and brought new competitions and inequalities among the new EU-
members and non-EU member states. Since the Schengen system is fundamentally 
about re-interpreting national borders and their meanings in regard to the movement 
of persons, it created a borderless or semi-open world for some and a new “iron 
curtain” for the other states in the region. Avoiding to import the local minority 
conflicts and poor immigrants, the EU placed aside the social ties, cultural 
proximity or ethnic origin as main criteria in its border management policies. 
(Hatvany,2006:49) However, as most of the new member states undergone 
problems related to crossborder kin minority policies or kin state 
affiliation(Hatvany,2006:49), they started to put pressure on the EU justice, 
freedom, security agenda and call for flexibility of border crossing policy has 
started to put pressure on the EU agenda.  
 
The introduction of the Schengen border code and visa policies interrupted the local 
habits of crossborder movement and caused indirect loses in the tourism and local 
market sector. In the case of Turkey and Bulgaria there is a continuity in the 
implementation of the visa policy, but there has been increase in the Bulgarian visa 
cost for the Turkish citizens. Although the Schengen system foresees visa 
facilitation fo the citizens of the candidate states that provides a right to enjoy visa-
free travel up to 90 day, this provision is not applied to the Turkish citizens. The 
costly and hardly obtainable Bulgarian visa prevents the growth of tourism between 
Bulgaria and Turkey. While Bulgarian citizens are provided the right to stay 3 
months in Turkey with a tourist visa, the Turkish citizens undergone strict visa and 
registration practices. As a result, beside its wide variety of alternative touristic 
opportunities Bulgaria hosts small number of tourists from Turkey (except the dual 
citizens), while Turkey is one of the favoured tourism sites for the vacational 
tourism.  
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Turkey is also a transit country for refugees and migrants from the South Asia, 
Middle East and Africa, but also a sourse country for Turkish emigration to Europe 
and receiving coountry for irregular migration from forder Soviet union. Since 90’s 
there has been an intensified grass roots movement from below which challenges 
the continuous functional norms of the border. However, except the liberalised 
mobility of the dual citizens, twin municipality governors, bussinessmen, these local 
factors suport the securitization of the bordering and migratory proceses. After the 
deadly experience of the restrictive visa policies applied to kin-minority members 
during 90’s, when in 1997 seven Bulgarian Turkish children were found death in a 
traffickers truck while passing illegaly to Turkey. Turkey took one-sided legislative, 
administrative measures to limit the negative effects of visa policies. However this 
kin-minority facilitation is temporary, applied only before the parliamentarian 
elections, and involve temporary single renewal of the residence permit. Because of 
the 3 months limitation of the stay in Turkey, hundreds of Bulgarian Turks are 
living in irregular status in Turkey. Because of this they do not have access to 
citizenship application until completed 10 years of residence. After the 
Europeanisation of the visa procedure, the law on work and residence conditions of 
the Turks and other kin immigrants in Turkey is not applicable anymore.  
 
There are available additional administrative mechanisms to limit the negative 
impact of return, border and visa regimes imposed through Europeanisation These 
measures are not in conflct with the EU regulations and involve application of 
ethnic preferences in migration regulation and naturalisation, provision of trans-
border nationality status for minorities or liberal visa for minority visitors, 
labourers, suitcase traders, students etc. 
 
One of the most successfull performances of the crossborder kin policy was the 
accomodation of the dual citizenship status. This status “solved” the issues of social 
rights and retirement problems of the migrants of 1989. Most of the aged migrants 
had to buy their alredy instolled retirement yeras from the Bulgarian government or 
most simply got satisfied by minimum retirement salaries in Turkey and Bulgaria. 
The highest advantage of the dual citizenship policy was the facilitation of the 
crossborder travel of the minority migrants of 1989. Yet the minority itself does not 
enjoy such freedom of travel to Turkey. Moreover, the Bulgaria’s dual citizenship 
policy bases on ethnic origin and kin solidarity. It is employed as a nation building 
tool and strengthens the spirit of the ethnic majority in post-communist Bulgaria.  
 
So far, the Europeanisation of the border has resulted in modernisation, 
technological improvement and professionalisation of the borders as institutions 
under integrated border management programs. Now there sre more effective, 
digitalised, selective, fast, clever and moving borders. The borders are connected 
through extensive digital data and networks and share immense information and 
data about the people who can pass and who cannot pass the border. Today the 
borders know and distance the ethnic, religious, professional, social background and 
fingerprint of each foreigner who pass the Europeanised borders. So in the case of 
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Bulgarian-Turkish borders we see a shift from demilitarized national borders to 
securitized and marketized European borders. For difference from the Cold War 
times, the rules and regulations governing the border today are changed not by 
gendarmeria or millitary bodies, but by policy decision makers, through built-in 
adaptive mechanisms such as internal auditing. Europeanisation does not require 
governments to relinquish control of the borders, instead EU integrated border 
management system requires standartized and optimized border structures. The 
increase in the illegal passages and human traficking applies strong challenge over 
the border functions from below.  
 
The Europeansation as a process of standartization across the borders, leads to 
immense degree of interaction and cooperation to take place between the border 
administrations at the both sides of the border. Integrated border Management 
foresees common border checkpoints, crossborder cooperation in risk and data 
analysis and exchange, education, orientation, coordination, patroling 
etc(Akman&Kılınç,2010:9).The data systems, criteria and mentality of selection, 
functions and approaches aqgainst irregular migration and human traficking are 
common. There is intensive SIS and Eurodac-based digital interraction between the 
border police at the two sides of the border. Co-operation in the field of migration 
and asylum through protection of human rights of (lawful) migrants; co-operation to 
improve security standards (biometrics in travel documents); functional border 
control and staffi ng, concluding readmission agreements; collaboration with 
sending, transit and destination countries in asylum management; and promotion of 
public awareness about the opportunities and limits of individuals’ rights in 
migratory movement.  
 
Regardless of the absence of direct reference on minorities, the overall security 
context may indirectly support the utilitarian approach by taking minorities into 
account as security issues on fringes of Europe. (Toth,2006:25) Indeed the 
European Parliament Regulation on local border traffic at the external borders of the 
EU about the border residents crossing of borders is not implemented at the 
Bulgarian-Turkish border. (Toth,2006:34) In fact, Bulgaria as a member states may 
conclude agreements on local border traffic with neighbouring third countries or 
maintain existing agreements provided that these agreements comply with the 
Regulation. Here the local historical and political prejudices and interests play role. 
 
“Bottom up” development of European integration at its borders (Gabbe 2006) 
bases on the idea that only actors from the cross-border region can efficiently design 
developmental tasks and projects, which fit to broader developmental strategies at 
regional, state or Community level. there are limits and shortcomings of such 
endeavour: The Shengen regime impose a new border-the EU border b/w an EU 
member and non-member state, these are two different statuses and positions that 
create inequality and marginalisation of the non-member part in the participation in 
any crossborder or regional developmental program. Very often the crossborder 
developmental programes require the applicant party from non-EU member states to 
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provide higher percent (around 15 %) of the total eligible cost, thus the non-member 
part faces both financial shortcomes or problems in fulfilling of eligibility criteria.. 
 
This dual situation across the Schengen border leads to new competitions that 
merge with the old local ethnic or national competitions for power, i.e. municipal 
government, public services and resource distribution. This leads to more 
segregation where ethnic groups create their own distinct and homogeneous cultural 
spaces, send their own representatives to the local municipalities and compete for 
resources along distinct ethnic and sectoral interests across the border. 
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